There is more attention than ever on the social implications of AI. In contrast to universalized paradigms of ethics and fairness, a growing body of critical work highlights bias and discrimination in AI within the frame of social justice and human rights ("AI justice"). However, the geographical location of much of this critique in the West could be engendering its own blind spots. The global supply chain of AI (data, computational power, natural resources, labor) today replicates historical colonial inequities, and the continued subordination of Global South countries. This paper draws attention to official narratives from the Indian government and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 1 advocating for the role (and place) of these regions in the AI economy. Domestically, these policies are being contested for their top-down formulation, and reflect narrow industry interests. This underscores the need to approach the political economy of AI from varying altitudes -global, national, and from the perspective of communities whose lives and livelihoods are most directly impacted in this economy. Without a deliberate effort at centering this conversation it is inevitable that mainstream discourse on AI justice will grow parallel to (and potentially undercut) demands emanating from Global South governments and communities.
Introduction
The overwhelming hyperbole about the impact of artificial intelligence technologies on society has encouraged an "us versus the AI" response. Under this paradigm, the threats produced by these new forms of technology are global, but also universal, and it is up to an abstract "us" to protect the "future of humanity" (Anderson & Rainie, 2018) or "what it means to be human" (Zuboff, 2018) . The universalized ethics and fairness discourse has met with stiff resistance from a rich body of research that focuses on the uses of AI as a tool to entrench power structures in society, particularly across the axes of race, class, and gender. This critical work has been overwhelmingly concentrated in the West, and much of it has been done in and about the United States. As scholars have argued, the geography and politics of this knowledge production does create hierarchies between the concerns and contexts that get the most visibility (Arora 2016; Milan and Treré 2017; Ricaurte 2019). Section 1 maps a few of these responses, drawing particular attention to a strand in the critique that urges for an embrace of a broader notion of the Global South, one that moves beyond geographical boundaries to connect the struggles of individuals and communities harmed or excluded by these technologies.
This metaphorizing could lead to powerful solidarities. However, Section 2 outlines how it might also engender its own blind spots if it does not simultaneously create space for narratives emanating from actual Global South countries, connected to their particular histories. This includes the official narratives that are being driven by political and economic elites in these countries. Over the last year, the Indian government and the UNCTAD have both released policy documents explicitly aimed at influencing Poster Presentation AIES '20, February 7-8, 2020, New York, NY, USA the role (and place) of these regions in the global political economy of AI.
In Section 3 we explore how these official narratives are drawing implicitly and sometimes directly from their colonial histories to argue that their participation in the global digital economy is also a question of redistributive justice. They focus on the competitiveness of these regions at multiple levels of the AI supply chain 2 from data, to computing infrastructure, to labor and skill development. Ultimately, however, these policy documents are elite, top-down narratives that rarely mention the lives and livelihoods of those often disempowered in the digital economy (like platform workers). The evolution of these policy documents, too, has largely been in closed quarters, and influenced primarily by a small subset of domestic industry groups who continue to be its most vocal supporters. There has been negligible participation from traditional digital rights groups who contest the legitimacy of the claims and the process of policy making.
Despite these flawed foundations, these evolving policy narratives must not be ignored by mainstream AI discourse. They offer an important provocation for a conversation around the geographical inequities embedded in the global supply chain of AI. We conclude with how insights from these official narratives (and the contestation around them) can shape the research and advocacy agenda around AI and justice going forward.
Colonial Metaphors
Scholars have drawn attention to empirical differences in Global South countries that are often lost in narratives around AI accountability and justice centered in the West. (Marda 2019) These range from institutional instability in young democracies and the lack of data protection laws, (Arora 2016; Milan and Treré 2017; Arun 2019) to the distinct ways that global tech companies approach these regions ("Not every population is equally attractive to capital") (Segura and Waisbord 2019). Arora (2016) points out that the essentializing of communities allows them to be used as "testbeds for innovations in technological surveillance". Scholars also point to how the market strategies and interventions of companies in these regions can mimic colonial logics and justifications (Irani et al 2010) .
Some of this critical work is calling for an embrace of the Global South as a broader concept encompassing the "different, the underprivileged, the silenced, the subalterns, the have nots…whose presence outdoes geographical boundaries" (Milan and Treré 2017, 320; Santos, 2016, Arun, 2019). The Global South, on this reading, can be-come a "lens" that binds together narratives of refugees in Europe and poor incarcerated black communities in the US with those of the disenfranchised communities in Global South countries (Arun 2019) . It also softens the contradictions that rigid and monolithic North/South narratives lead to, like when Chinese companies have surveilled and exploited Zimbabwean people for their data without consent.
(Arun 2019) This has similarities to work that uses "data colonialism" as metaphor to understand the data practices within surveillance capitalism (Couldry & Mejias 2018) . Colonialism is metaphorized to represent "accumulation by dispossession" by tech companies who "colonize...everyday life" (Thatcher et al, 2016) .
Creating a metaphor of both colonialism and the Global South runs the risk of creating its own blind spots. It may result in a more "global" discourse but one which continues to pay little attention to developments, policies, and narratives particular to actual countries in the Global South. "The Global south is everywhere, but also somewhere", Matthew Sparke notes (Sparke 2007, when he argues in favor of interrupting metaphors of borderless worlds, highlighting the asymmetry and inequality of Global South nations amidst growing global interdependency. Bhabha (2011) has argued that enhancing "national resources" of these countries must be a key part of addressing both the "global political economy of resource distribution and the transnational moral economy of redistributive justice". The ability of Global South countries to participate in and influence the AI economy and AI policy remains understudied, and advocacy around this is rare amidst the otherwise rich discourse on social justice and AI.
Meanwhile, policy narratives that take this national perspective are emerging, as we explore in depth in the following section. The proposals are not the familiar algorithmic accountability or data protection frameworks, but instead data server localization, data sharing mandates, competition law, and industrial policy aimed at serving domestic industry. This discourse will make it clear that this is not merely a variation of the surveillance capitalism and corresponding "tech-lash" playing out all over the world (albeit with empirical variations). Instead, it is a narrative that can only be understood within the specific political and historical trajectories of these countries.
"National" Narratives
In this section, we explore the main themes and arguments made in UNCTAD's digital economy report of September 2019 (UNCTAD, 2019) and in the draft Indian eCommerce Policy released in February 2019 (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, India 2019). These appear to be the clearest articulations of an official policy agenda that focuses on the perspective of Global South countries.
It is worth noting that these institutional narratives do not selfidentify as being "about AI" and are often distinct from national AI policies. They focus instead on arguments of equity vis-à-vis access to material inputs required for AI and the digital economy as a whole, such as data and computing infrastructure. The fact that these institutional narratives do not see themselves as within the conversation around AI and justice, and are not perceived as such, could be because material realities have been marginal to mainstream Western AI accountability discourse, with few (if growing) exceptions (Crawford and Joler 2018; Irani, 2015; Roberts, 2014) . A testament to the agenda-setting power of Western "AI ethics" discourse, India's official "National AI policy" has a superficial AI ethics chapter that reproduces borrowed and universalized tropes (Daly et al. 2019) whereas its aggressive data
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The UNCTAD report focusses on the asymmetry between 'developing countries' and 'advanced economies', noting that without deliberate and sustained policy interventions, developing countries may find it "virtually impossible" to "catch-up" in the digital economy. Critically, that these regions risk losing the "ability to develop indigenous innovation ecosystems". The Report also argues that the concentration of material infrastructure (data, computing, and developer capacity) in a handful of foreign multinationals will result in "technology designed in and for the needs of other geographical areas."
The grand vision of "indigenous innovation systems" might promise alternative logics and futures, but the report eventually scopes it as a much narrower requirement for domestic industries to gain a competitive advantage against foreign technology giants. The report rarely moves beyond market solutions concluding that the "greatest value (for these countries) is likely to emanate from the monetization of large-scale digital data". What follows then is a set of policy options for governments to consider, including encouraging stimulus for local innovation, building local computing infrastructure to serve domestic needs, and global tax reform to lead to fairer redistribution of tax revenues. The focus on domestic industry is justified in terms of generating valuable local content, positing that Western companies are likely to be "poorly aligned with local market needs". Yet there is little in the report that justifies why domestic enterprises, by virtue of their location alone, will be in a position to serve local community interests even as they replicate the same business models that have caused the backlash against their Silicon Valley counterparts.
The Indian government's draft National eCommerce Policy is similar in that it paints a broad vision of reclaiming "data sovereignty", but its recommendations focus narrowly on improving the competitiveness of Indian companies. The draft Policy notes that the data of Indians is best understood as a collective resource, a "national asset" which the government holds in trust. Just as foreigners don't get equal access to "coal mines" or "spectrum" in India, the draft Policy argues Indian citizens and companies must get first priority at the "economic benefits from the monetization of data". Since a handful of US companies have deep and large troves of personal and behavioral data about Indians, the report argues that the first mover advantage gained by these firms is so immense, "the possibility of Indian business entities creating high value digital products would be almost nil". To encourage Indian entities, the draft Policy recommends a host of aggressive policy moves. The main thrust is that companies should be forced to store data of Indian residents within the territorial boundaries of India. This would clear the way to then mandate the sharing of these datasets by foreign companies to both Indian companies and the government. As a way to boost the already vibrant start-up culture, the localization of servers in India is also promoted as a boost to local job creation. There is also a broader government narrative that looks at localization of servers as one way in which to establish the legal jurisdiction of foreign tech companies in India, arguing that more physical presence within territorial borders will mean easier enforceability of Indian laws and policies.
Finally, reminiscent of concerns with both the "brain drain" from India to Silicon Valley (Rizvi 2005 ) and India's place as a Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) hub (Sandhu 2006) , the draft Policy notes that India's place in the supply chain should not be for "lowskilled outsourced data work".
Indian The top-down formulation of this policy is also borne out by its failure to acknowledge the perspective of millions of workers currently employed in the largest AI-powered platform companies, from Amazon to Uber. It never makes the case for why a domestically-oriented platform economy would result in better lives and livelihoods for these communities, beyond stating that it will lead to "national development" 
Disrupting Silicon Valley Consensus
This internal contestation does not diminish the fact that this policy narrative seems to have de-stabilized the seemingly settled international regime on data flows. Driven largely by US tech companies, this regime posits "free flow of data" between companies and countries across the globe as necessary for the success of the digital economy, and is often referred to as the "Silicon Valley consensus" (Streinz, 2019; Zuboff, 2018) . Through various international governance mechanisms, it limits the ability of nation states to regulate company decisions like where to process or store data, or where to open offices, and pay taxes. In this context, the Indian government's proposal to mandate data storage in India has met with intensive pushback from US industry lobby groups and government trade representatives (Streinz, 2019) . There is a particular anxiety around these policy moves replicating the "Chinese model", evoking fears that Chinese data sovereignty policies might be influencing other countries (Chrichton, 2018) . Meanwhile, US Trade Representatives are aggressively pushing towards binding commitments to the "free flow of data" in bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements.
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India's attempt at disrupting this regime must be situated within its longer history protesting the use of global trade agreements to disempower policy making in and for the Global South. (Hurrell & Narlikar, 2006) Countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa have often been at the forefront of advocating for more equitable global trade laws, like the pushback to patent regimes (TRIPS) that tried to frustrate generic drug manufacturing that would allow affordable access to medicines, or the restrictions on farmer subsidies that were aimed at ensuring domestic food security. (Ghosh, 2014) Notably, the government's efforts on these issues got broad non-governmental support. For example, while generic drug manufacturers were major drivers in the pushback against TRIPS, they were supported by access-to-medicine NGOs, health activists and trade unions. (Murphy, 2010; He & Murphy, 2007) In stark contrast, the Indian government's efforts against the global data flows regime seem to draw solidarity almost exclusively from domestic industry lobbies who remain the policy's most vocal supporters outside of government. (Kak, 2018) What combative national narratives like the Indian policy also conceal are the many layers of dependencies Global South governments continue to have on foreign technology companies. Parallel to these aggressive policy stances, large AI incubators are being funded and controlled by the same set of companies, like Google's new AI labs in Bangalore (Yagnik, 2019) , and Ghana (Wiggers, 2018) or IBM's new research center in Brazil (Mari, 2019). Taylor & Broeders (2015) have also explored the "growing agency of corporations as development actors" in lower and middleincome countries, that justify their market expansion as necessary to meet development objectives.
Unpacking these narratives offers multiple provocations for a broader conversation around the political economy of AI. This analysis need to happen at the unit of particular countries by understanding impacts of the AI industry on national economies; the geographic distribution of data, computational resources, labor; and the legal regimes that facilitate these inequities. It is equally important for this analysis to be in conversation with the real impacts on lives and livelihoods of those most directly impacted by the AI economy, like platform workers. The UNCTAD paper mentions "indigenous innovation systems" as better than Western-centric innovation for the Global South.
There is more work to be done to unpack that claim, rooting it in the experiences of the communities it speaks on behalf of.
In Europe too, where resistance to Silicon Valley hegemony is strong and from varied interest groups, there are attempts to craft alternative data models to surveillance capitalism, managed and controlled by communities. Models of data co-operativism and data commons are being piloted by city governments in Barcelona and Amsterdam through the DECODE EU project (De-code, n.d).
The project experiments with a number of strategies including a "decentralized citizens-owned data ecosystem" and Barcelona's Decidim.barcelona is focusing on creating participatory process around data access and algorithmic transparency (Decidim.barcelona, n.d) Although these are Western city-led initiatives, their focus on democratizing access to data and infrastructure through participatory modes offers lessons to emerging policy narratives in the Global South.
Conclusion
Abstraction has been a pernicious tool in the conversation around the social implications of AI. The universalized discourse around ethics has served to obscure the various axes of power that determine who decides how these technologies are configured, deployed, and who is harmed. The policy response to this focuses on the use of civil rights and human rights frameworks as a means of redress for individuals and communities. The focus seems to lie mostly on empirical realities of the Global North, and more work is needed to build intersecting global solidarities.
The argument put forth here is that 'abstracting' to the level of the nation state might also be required. Bringing focus to the role of specific nations and regions in the global AI supply chain allows us to see how economic and colonial histories continue to subordinate entire peoples and governments. Official policy narratives emanating from the Global South are indicators that this conversation is already afoot.
Turning our gaze to government narratives does not imply relying on the nation state as the only, or even the most important unit for moving towards justice. These official policies have evolved in a top-down manner and are driven largely by domestic business elites, which means that they rarely (if ever) provide perspectives of those whose lives and livelihoods are most vulnerable to the AI industry, like platform workers.
A conversation around the global political economy of AI should therefore enter from varying altitudes, and necessarily draw from multiple disciplines. International legal studies and trade and development studies provide the geopolitical institutional context for these policy developments, while post-colonial studies in geography and the history of computing and informatics offer a rich and critical theoretical lens. There is also promising experimental work ongoing at the city-level in Europe, that focus on models of governance like data commons and data cooperatives to offer economic alternatives to the hegemony of the Silicon Valley business model. This could enrich the currently narrow 'data sovereignty' agendas being promoted by political and economic elites in countries like India.
Given the vast amount of public attention and research funding invested into AI, expanding the contours of what counts as AI justice to include these emerging fields of enquiry is critical, with material consequences for large parts of the world's population
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